CONNEKT

COUNTRY PAPER
ON MICRO-LEVEL DRIVERS

Drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism
in the light of individual dynamics in MENA and the Balkans

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Introduction

Kosovo is one of the most recent additions to the global community, having declared its independence in February 2008 due to the tumultuous disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. However, even after 15 years since its declaration of independence, it remains a state of contention on the international stage. The nation has garnered recognition from over half of the member states within the United Nations (UN). Nonetheless, it still lacks recognition from two influential members of the UN Security Council – namely, Russia and China. Furthermore, it has secured recognition from 22 out of the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) and from 26 out of the 30 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the other hand, Kosovo is recognised by all of its immediate neighbours, with the exception of Serbia, with whom it continues to have a tense relationship.

According to the latest census conducted in 2011, the population composition of Kosovo is as follows: Albanians 92.9%, Bosniaks 1.6%, Serbs 1.5%, Turks 1.1%, Ashkali 0.9%, Egyptians 0.7%, Gorani 0.6%, Romani 0.5%, and other/unspecified 0.2%. In terms of religious affiliation, the distribution is as follows: Muslims 95.6%, Roman Catholics 2.2%, Orthodox Christians 1.5%, other 0.1%, none 0.1%, and unspecified 0.6%.[1]

During the span of 2012 to 2016, a period marked by complex dynamics and far-reaching consequences, Kosovo found itself entangled in a situation where an estimated 359 of its citizens, encompassing 255 men, 49 women, and 55 children, ventured into conflict-ridden territories in the Middle East. Additionally, during this period, 41 children were born within the conflict zone. Notably, no new cases have been reported since 2017.[2]

Against this background, the research objective of this paper is to analyse the individual root causes of violent extremism (VE) at the micro level in Kosovo, considering the seven pre-identified drivers: religion, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, digital socialisation, political grievances, and education, culture, and leisure opportunities.

In this regard, it must be emphasised that the results of the research conducted at the macro level indicate that the driver of religion, specifically the violent misinterpretations of Islam, represents the major factor in fuelling VE. Furthermore, this driver is inherently intertwined with two other drivers: digital literacy (online propaganda) and transnational dynamics (global radical Islamic ideologies and movements). Therefore, they are considered the most significant drivers related to VE in Kosovo. The research demonstrates that the impact of other drivers is more peripheral.[3]

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[1] Kosovo Statistical Agency, Regjistrimi i popullsisë, ekonomive familjare dhe banesave në Kosovë, Prishtina, 2011.

[2] European Commission, Kosovo 2018 Report, Strasbourg, 17 April 2018.

[3] Peci L. and Demjaha A. CONNEKT Kosovo Country Paper on Macro-Level Drivers, Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean, July 2021.

On the other hand, the research results conducted at the meso level in the municipalities of South Mitrovica, Gjilan, and Gjakova demonstrate a general alignment with those at the macro level. In these three cases, the driver of religion has been identified as the primary factor contributing to VE, closely intertwined with the drivers of digital socialisation and transnational dynamics. However, the driver of territorial inequalities has shown no significant impact on radicalism and VE.[4]

Regarding the other drivers, the results reveal differences in nuances regarding their impact on radicalism and VE. In the case of South Mitrovica, participants perceive the drivers of economic deprivation and the driver related to education, leisure, and cultural opportunities as having a certain impact on radicalisation and VE. The driver of political grievances is considered peripheral, while the driver of territorial inequalities is largely insignificant. In the case of Gjilan, participants perceive the drivers of economic deprivation, political grievances, and the driver related to education, leisure, and cultural opportunities as having a peripheral impact on radicalisation and VE. Lastly, in the municipality of Gjakova, the drivers of economic deprivation and the sub-driver of education, as well as the driver of political grievances, are perceived as having a certain impact on radicalisation and VE, whereas the driver of leisure and cultural opportunities is largely insignificant.[5]

Since the research at the meso level was conducted in three out of the seven major municipalities/district centres of Kosovo, the research at the micro level is focused on the remaining four major municipalities/district centres: Prishtina (the capital), Prizren, Ferizaj, and Peja. The selection of these municipalities/district centres was based on the rationale that this research project should encompass all district centres of Kosovo to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the preselected drivers of VE in the country.

Against this background, the following research questions will guide the data analysis:
- What is the relevance granted by responders to each driver?
- How do the drivers interact with each other?
- How does exposure to violence have an impact on the perception of the drivers?
- What is the opinion of youth regarding public policies on preventing violent extremism (PVE)?

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[4] Peci L. and Demjaha A. CONNEKT Kosovo Country Paper on Meso-Level Drivers, Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean, October 2022.

[5] Ibid.

Methodological approach

The analyses of the individual root causes of VE among youth from the age 15 to 30 years in relation to the seven pre-identified drivers of VE was conducted in the district centres (municipalities) of Prishtina, Ferizaj, Peja, and Prizren. The rationale behind this selection of district centres is based on covering all regions of Kosovo with the research conducted within WP5 and WP6 in order to get a comprehensive picture of the state of affairs related to the pre-identified drivers of VE among youth throughout the entire territory of the country.

In this regard, it should be noted that the total population in the municipality of Prishtina is 198,897, the municipality of Ferizaj 108,610, the municipality of Peja 96,450, and the municipality of Prizren 177,781. The total population of these district centres – municipalities is 581,288, and the population of Prishtina amounts to 34.2%, Ferizaj, 18.6%, Peja 16.6%, and Prizren 30.6%.[6]

The structure of the population in the municipality of Prishtina, according to ethnic background (nationality) is mainly dominated by Albanians with 97.7%, and Turks with 1%. Ashkalis are 0.3% while other ethnic groups make up around 1% of the population of the municipality of Prishtina. In terms of religious background, 97.2% of the population have declared themselves to be of Islamic belief; meanwhile, from the other part, 0.24% have declared themselves to be Orthodox, 0.58% Catholic, and 1.5% are persons without any religious background. According to the age groups in the municipality of Prishtina, the age group (0-14) constitutes 25.8% of the total population, the age group (15-29) constitutes 26.5%, while the age group (30-80+) makes up 47.7% of the population of the municipality. Regarding the type of habitat in the municipality of Prishtina, 81.3% of the population lives in the urban zones, while 18.7% lives in the rural zones.[7]

The population structure in the municipality of Ferizaj, according to ethnic background (nationality) is mainly dominated by Albanians with 96%, Ashkalis are 3%, while other ethnic groups make up around 1% of the population of the municipality of Ferizaj. In terms of religious background, 98.6% of the population have declared themselves to be of Islamic belief; meanwhile, from the other part, 0.38% were declared as Catholics, 0.04% of orthodox religion, and the other 0.59% include individuals without religious affiliation, as well as those who have preferred not to answer. According to the age groups in the municipality of Ferizaj, the age group (0-14) constitutes 29% of the total population, the age group (15-29) constitutes 27.1%, while the age group (30-80+) makes up 43.7% of the population of the municipality. Regarding the

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[6] Agjencia e StatistikavetëKosovës [Kosovo Agency for Statistics] (2017). "Vlerësim, Popullsia e Kosovës [Assessment, The Population of Kosovo]". Available at: http://ask.rks.gov.net/ media/4118/vlersimi-i-popullsise-2017.pdf

[7] Agjencia e StatistikavetëKosovës [Kosovo Agency for Statistics] (2011). "Popullsiasipasmoshavedhellojittëvendbanimit [The population according to age and the type of habitat]". Available at: https://ask.rks-gov.net/media/2074/te-dhenat-kryesore.pdf, and Agjencia e StatistikavetëKosovës [Kosovo Agency for Statistics] (2011). "Popullsiasipasgjinisë, religjionitdhekomunës [Population according to gender, religion and municipality]". Available at: https://askdata.rks-gov.net/pxweb/sq/ASKdata/ASKdata__Census%20population__Census%202011 __3%20 By%20Municipalities/tab%205%205.px/

habitat type in the municipality of Ferizaj, 39.2% of the population lives in the urban zones, while 60.8% lives in the rural zones.[8]

The structure of the population in the municipality of Peja, according to the ethnic background (nationality) is mainly dominated by Albanians with 91.2%, Bosniaks are 3%, and Egyptians 2.8%, while other ethnic groups make up around 3% of the population of the municipality of Peja. Regarding religious background, 96.3% of the population have declared themselves of Islamic belief, 2.6% were declared as catholic, while only 1.1% of the municipality's population belong to other religious beliefs. According to the age groups in the municipality of Peja, the age group (0-14) constitutes 25.9% of the total population, the age group (15-29) constitutes 26.8%, while the age group (30-80+) makes up 47.3% of the population of the municipality. Regarding the habitat type in the municipality of Peja, 50.8% of the population lives in the urban zones, while 49.2% lives in the rural zones.[9]

The structure of the population in the municipality of Prizren, according to ethnic background (nationality) is mainly dominated by Albanians with 81.9%, 9.5% are Bosniaks, 5.1 are Turks, and 1.63% are Roma, while other ethnic groups make up around 1% of the population of the municipality of Prizren. In terms of religious background, 96% of the population have declared themselves to be of Islamic belief, 3.3% were declared as catholic, 0.01% of Orthodox belief, and 0.35% of others are persons without religious belonging, as well as those who have preferred not to answer this question. According to the age groups in the municipality of Prizren, the age group (0-14) constitutes 14.5% of the total population, age group (15-29) constitutes 27.5%, while the age group (30-80+) makes up 57.5% of the population of the municipality. Regarding the habitat type in the municipality of Prizren, 53.2% of the population lives in the urban zones, while 46.8% lives in the rural zones.[10]

Based on the number of citizens and the type of habitat, the samples of non-random surveys conducted face-to-face with the youth of the age group of 15 to 30 years were 138 in Prishtina (113 Urban, 25 Rural), 128 (85 Urban, 43 Rural) in Prizren, 72 (26 Urban, 46 Rural) in Ferizaj and 66 (32 Urban, 34 Rural) in Peja, amounting 404 in total. It should be noted that all the participants in this research were Kosovo Albanians. Prior to administering the in-person surveys, the questionnaires were translated from English into the Albanian language. Furthermore, preparatory training sessions were conducted with the KIPRED staff members, addressing ethical considerations pertinent to survey conduction. The staff at KIPRED obtained written consent from all research participants, meticulously archiving these documents. Subsequently, all finalised surveys were rendered anonymous and subjected to processing and analysis within the SPSS database.

The general statistics of the profile of the participants in this survey related to the type and size of the settlement, gender, religion, and age are as follows:

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

Type of settlement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Rural	147	36.4	36.4	36.4
	Urban	257	63.6	63.6	100.0
	Total	404	100.0	100.0	

Settlement size (inhabitants)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	until 2,000	73	18.1	18.1	18.1
	2,001 - 5,000	59	14.6	14.6	32.7
	5,001 - 20,000	18	4.5	4.5	37.1
	20,001 - 50,000	13	3.2	3.2	40.3
	50,001 - 100,000	50	12.4	12.4	52.7
	more than 100,000	191	47.3	47.3	100.0
	Total	404	100.0	100.0	

Sex (gender)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	160	39.6	39.6	39.6
	Female	231	57.2	57.2	96.8
	Other	6	1.5	1.5	98.3
	Don't want to answer	7	1.7	1.7	100.0
	Total	404	100.0	100.0	

Religious belonging

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Catholicism	14	3.5	3.5	3.5
	Islam	352	87.1	87.6	91.0
	Protestantism	2	0.5	0.5	91.5
	Judaism	4	1.0	1.0	92.5
	Coptic	1	0.2	0.2	92.8
	I am an atheist	6	1.5	1.5	94.3
	I have no religion	12	3.0	3.0	97.3
	Don't want to answer	11	2.7	2.7	100.0
	Total	402	99.5	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	2	0.5		
Total		404	100.0		

Age Group	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent
15 – 18	53	13.10%	13.10%
18 – 25	298	73.80%	73.80%
25 – 30	53	13.10%	13.10%

When it comes to the living circumstances in terms of education and employment, the general statistics of the profile participants in this survey is as follows:

Living circumstances

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Alone	12	3.0	3.0	3.0
	With both parents	337	83.4	84.0	87.0
	With my mother	18	4.5	4.5	91.5
	With my father	2	0.5	0.5	92.0
	With my partner or spouse	16	4.0	4.0	96.0
	With friends/relatives	5	1.2	1.2	97.3
	Something else, what?	6	1.5	1.5	98.8
	No answer	5	1.2	1.2	100.0
	Total	401	99.3	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	3	0.7		
Total		404	100.0		

Highest level of education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Uncompleted and completed primary school	3	0.7	0.8	0.8
	Three-year secondary school	54	13.4	14.4	15.2
	Four-year secondary school	45	11.1	12.0	27.2
	Baccalaureate/Graduate study (College)	264	65.3	70.4	97.6
	MA or PhD	9	2.2	2.4	100.0
	Total	375	92.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	29	7.2		
Total		404	100.0		

Current employment status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employed full-time	77	19.1	19.8	19.8
	Employed part-time	23	5.7	5.9	25.8
	Work independently/free-lance	8	2.0	2.1	27.8
	Unemployed	25	6.2	6.4	34.3
	Pupil	51	12.6	13.1	47.4
	Student	198	49.0	51.0	98.5
	Agricultural worker	1	0.2	0.3	98.7
	Company owner	4	1.0	1.0	99.7
	Other	1	0.2	0.3	100.0
	Total	388	96.0	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	16	4.0		
Total		404	100.0		

On the other hand, the general statistics of the profile participants in this survey regarding the highest level of education and employment status of their parents is as follows:

Highest level of education of the participants' mothers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Uncompleted and completed primary school	63	15.6	16.2	16.2
	Three-year secondary school	58	14.4	14.9	31.0
	Four-year secondary school	147	36.4	37.7	68.7
	Baccalaureate/Graduate study (College)	96	23.8	24.6	93.3
	MA or PhD	26	6.4	6.7	100.0
	Total	390	96.5	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	14	3.5		
Total		404	100.0		

Current employment status of the participants' mothers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employed full-time	131	32.4	33.9	33.9
	Employed part-time	28	6.9	7.3	41.2
	Work independently/free-lance	38	9.4	9.8	51.0
	Unemployed	152	37.6	39.4	90.4
	Agricultural worker	3	0.7	0.8	91.2
	Company owner	7	1.7	1.8	93.0
	Other	27	6.7	7.0	100.0
	Total	386	95.5	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	18	4.5		
Total		404	100.0		

Highest level of education of the participant's fathers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Uncompleted and completed primary school	32	7.9	8.2	8.2
	Three-year secondary school	55	13.6	14.0	22.2
	Four-year secondary school	143	35.4	36.5	58.7
	Baccalaureate/Graduate study (College)	109	27.0	27.8	86.5
	MA or PhD	52	12.9	13.3	99.7
	Other	1	0.2	0.3	100.0
	Total	392	97.0	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	12	3.0		
Total		404	100.0		

Current employment status of the participants' fathers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	0.2	0.3	0.3
	Employed full-time	225	55.7	58.1	58.4
	Employed part-time	14	3.5	3.6	62.0
	Work independently/free-lance	32	7.9	8.3	70.3
	Unemployed	21	5.2	5.4	75.7
	Student	1	0.2	0.3	76.0
	Agricultural worker	19	4.7	4.9	80.9
	Company owner	51	12.6	13.2	94.1
	Other	22	5.4	5.7	99.7
	88	1	0.2	0.3	100.0
	Total	387	95.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing value	17	4.2		
Total		404	100.0		

The general statistics above demonstrate diverse socioeconomic backgrounds of the participants in the survey, which provides a solid basis for analysing the drivers of VE at the micro level. However, it should be noted that a small number of participants were unwilling to answer all the survey questions. Nonetheless, this fact does not undermine the quality of the survey.

Research results

ANALYSES OF THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AT THE MICRO LEVEL

In this section, the perceptions among respondents regarding the drivers of VE, namely religion, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, digital socialisation, political grievances, education, culture and leisure opportunities, and transnational dynamics, will be analysed.

Religion

In the aftermath of the conflict, Kosovo's population, still grappling with the impacts of war, found itself in contact with a range of international faith-based organisations that spread across the nation. These organisations, ostensibly providing humanitarian aid, took advantage of the widespread poverty and fragmented societal conditions among Kosovar Albanians, especially in rural locales. This exploitation led to a significant upheaval of cultural traditions within these communities. Interestingly, the actions of faith-based "humanitarian organisations" harbouring radical intentions received minimal attention or insufficient scrutiny from both United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the wider international community presence. Amid this timeframe, the shift toward democracy fostered the establishment of new links connecting Kosovo to the broader Muslim world, consequently creating an avenue for the revival of various religious ideologies. The rejuvenation of Islam in Kosovo found distinct influence from Saudi Arabia, alongside other Gulf States and Turkey. While their central aim involved moulding the spiritual inclinations of the population, instrumentalising Islam, and promoting an unfavourable stance towards secularism within Kosovo, numerous Middle Eastern entities were concurrently dedicated to the propagation and reinforcement of radical Islam. Hence, the previously unchallenged conception of Islam in Kosovo, which stood as a distinct and traditional model, commenced a transformative journey in the aftermath of the war. This gradual evolution then cast its influence on the secular ethnic identity of Kosovo Albanians, consequently reshaping the landscape of religious coexistence.[11]

Amidst this backdrop, a 2016 opinion poll shed light on the extent of religiosity in Kosovo. The findings of this survey revealed that this level is higher among Albanian Muslims compared to Albanian Christians. The collective religious identity among Albanian Muslims – comprising those who prioritise their identity as Muslims over that of Albanians, as well as those exclusively identifying as Muslims – was indicated by 34.5% of the participants. On the other hand, the corresponding collective religious identity among Albanian Christians – encompassing those who prioritise their identity as Christians over that of Albanians, as well as those exclusively identifying as Christians – was indicated by 22.1% of the respondents.[12]

Against this background, the findings of this research show that the majority of participants demonstrated a high level of religiosity. In this regard, 60.9% of respondents identified themselves as true believers who accept all teachings of their respective religions, while 24% identified themselves as religious but do not accept all teachings of their respective religions.

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[11] Demjaha A. and Peci L., What Happened to Kosovo Albanians: The Impact of Religion on the Ethnic Identity in the State Builiding Period, Prishtina, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, 2016, p. 5.

[12] Ibid. p. 72.

On the other hand, the research results indicate that female respondents and those living in rural areas tend to exhibit higher religiosity levels than male respondents. Among female respondents, 62.5% identified themselves as true believers, and 26.3% identified as religious but do not accept all religious teachings. In contrast, among male respondents, 57.3% identified themselves as true believers, and 22.2% identified as religious but do not accept all religious teachings. Similarly, 71.35% of respondents living in rural areas identified themselves as true believers, while 17.5% identified as religious but do not accept all religious teachings. On the other hand, among respondents living in urban areas, 55.0% identified themselves as true believers, and 28.3% identified as religious but do not accept all religious teachings.

Level of religiosity

12

Regarding the frequency of praying, the respondents have shown slightly different behaviour. 35.0% of respondents have declared that they pray regularly, 34% often, and 18.9% sometimes, whereas 7.7% regularly worship in their religious sites, 11% often, 45.6% sometimes, and 34.9% never. On the other hand, the research data shows that female respondents and those living in rural areas pray more frequently than male respondents and those living in urban areas. In this regard, 37.8 % of female respondents pray regularly and 38.7% often, whereas 29.9% of male respondents pray regularly and 27.4% often. On the other hand, 42,4% of respondents living in rural areas pray regularly and 33.1% often, in contrast to those living in urban areas, 31.0% pray regularly and 34.5% often. Similar trends among participants are noticed regardless of their living areas (urban/rural) or gender, as well as their level of education, parents' education, employment status, and parents' employment status.

Frequency of praying

Frequency of attending religious services in church/mosque/sinagogue

An interesting finding of this research is that, according to the participants' perceptions, the majority attribute radicalisation to a community concern. In this vein, 36.1% of respondents think radicalisation is not a concern, 55.2% is a concern, and 8.5% think it is the most important concern in their communities. Similar trends are noticed regardless of the respondent's level of education, the education of their parents, their employment status, and their parents' employment status.

Perception of radicalisation as a concern

When it comes to the influence of religious communities in the areas where they live, the majority of respondents (50.1%) believe that it is significant but not decisive. 14.6% consider it exceptionally significant, 10.7% perceive it as slight, 9.7% believe it has no influence, and 14.8% responded that they do not know. These perceptions remain consistent among participants regardless of their living areas (urban/rural), gender, level of education, parents' education, employment status, and parents' employment status.

Influence of religious community

On the other hand, religious holidays are regularly celebrated by the majority of respondents (75.3%) or often (13.0%), with 8.9% celebrating them sometimes, and only 2.8% never celebrating them. However, the research results indicate that female respondents (81.7%) and those living in rural areas (78.7%) celebrate religious holidays more regularly compared to males (65.6%) and those living in urban areas (13.1%).

Celebration of religious holidays

In conclusion, this research has yielded several noteworthy findings. Firstly, a considerable portion of respondents exhibited a high level of religiosity. However, it is interesting to note that while the majority of participants considered the influence of religious communities in their respective areas as significant, the research results also indicated that most respondents perceived radicalisation as a community concern.

Overall, the survey results suggest that participants' attitudes towards religion, their perceptions of the influence of religious communities, and their concerns regarding radicalisation are primarily influenced by their living areas (urban/rural) and gender, rather than their level of education, employment status, or their parents' educational and employment backgrounds.

Economic deprivation

Kosovo has historically been noted for having one of the weaker economies in Europe. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita recorded in 2022 reached 4,648.14 US dollars. However, there has been an upward trend, and the GDP per capita in Kosovo reached 12,469.45 US dollars in the same year when adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP), and the GDP growth rate reached 3.55%.[13] In 2021, the unemployment rate for the population aged 15-64 was 25.8%, with a gender disparity of 29.7% for females and 24.2% for males.[14]

Income class

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[13] Trading Economics, Country Kosovo, https://tradingeconomics.com/kosovo/indicators
[14] European Commission, Kosovo 2022 Report, Brussels, October 2022, p. 72.

Against this background, the research data reveals that when it comes to income class perceptions, 59% of respondents identified themselves as belonging to the middle class, 21.4% to the upper middle class, 8.8% to the lower middle class, 6.7% to the upper class, and 1.3% to the poor and near poor class. Interestingly, there was a similar distribution of responses across participants living in urban and rural areas, as well as among different genders.

On the other hand, the research data shows that out of the 404 participants in this study, 115 (28.46%) are employed. Interestingly, as the charts bellow show, the majority of respondents, irrespective of gender or settlement, expressed either satisfaction or high satisfaction with their jobs.

Furthermore, the vast majority of respondents (95.83%) in this research have declared that they have their own rooms. On the other hand, an interesting finding is that the majority of respondents who live with their parents (72.24%) do so because it is the best solution for their families. Additionally, 8.48% of respondents stated that they would choose to live independently if they had the means. Furthermore, 4.24% expressed that they would prefer to live alone, but their parents do not support the idea. The remaining respondents did not provide a response to this question.

In summary, the research results of this survey indicate that the majority of participants belong to the middle class or upper middle class. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the majority of employed

participants expressed satisfaction with their jobs. Furthermore, almost all participants stated that they have their own room, and a significant number of them live with their parents because it is the best solution for their families. Therefore, based on the research data, it can be concluded that there is no evidence of economic deprivation among participants, regardless of their settlement, gender, education, parents' education, and income class.

Territorial inequalities

The analysed research data reveals that the majority of respondents (84.4%) feel safe in their neighbourhoods, while 11.1% feel neither safe nor unsafe, and 4.3% feel unsafe. It is worth noting that female respondents tend to feel slightly less safe than their male counterparts, and those living in urban neighbourhoods tend to feel slightly less safe compared to those in rural areas.

In this regard, respondents' perceptions regarding their safety feelings in their area, town, or city show slight variations. Specifically, 59.5% of respondents feel safe, 34.9% feel neither safe nor unsafe, and 5.3% feel unsafe.

Furthermore, similar to the case of neighbourhoods, respondents from rural areas tend to feel slightly safer than respondents from urban areas in their areas/towns and cities. Additionally, female respondents generally express a significantly lower sense of safety compared to their male counterparts in these settings. Moreover, these perception patterns regarding safety feelings in the respondents' area/town/city remain consistent regardless of their living arrangements, education, employment status, parents' education and employment status, and settlement size categories.

An interesting finding of this research is that respondents feel slightly less safe at the country level. Specifically, 56.4% of respondents feel safe, 30% feel neither safe nor unsafe, and 13.1% feel unsafe. Moreover, as the presented research results in the charts bellow show, respondents from rural and urban areas report similar levels of perceived safety at the country level. However, female respondents generally tend to feel less safe compared to their male counterparts.

In conclusion, the research findings from this survey indicate that respondents generally feel safer in their neighbourhoods compared to their area/town/city and at the country level. Male respondents and those residing in rural areas tend to perceive higher safety levels than female respondents and those in urban areas. However, overall, there is no significant variation in safety perceptions based on participants' living arrangements, education level, employment status, or their parents' education and employment status. Therefore, the research data does not suggest a significant impact of territorial inequalities on safety perceptions among the participants.

Digital socialisation

Kosovo stands out with the highest number of high-speed internet subscriptions per household in Europe. Remarkably, its Internet penetration rate exceeds 135%, outpacing even the most advanced EU nations.[15] Against this background, the research data indicates that nearly all respondents (99.8%) have access to the Internet, with no significant difference observed among participants based on their background. In terms of Internet usage, 34% of respondents reported spending over 4 hours per day online, followed by 26.1% spending 3-4 hours, 20.6% spending 2-3 hours, 8.4% being unsure of their usage, 7.7% spending 1-2 hours,

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[15] The Kosovo Digital Economy (KODE) project, Digital Infrastructure Boosts Resilience and Improves Lives in Rural Kosovo, Ministry of Economy, Prishtina, May 2022, https://kodeproject.org/en/blog/2022/05/13/digital-infrastructure-boosts-resilience-and-improves-lives-in-rural-kosovo/

and 2.7% spending up to one hour. As the charts bellow show, similar Internet use patterns were observed among female and male respondents and those residing in rural and urban areas.

Regarding the purposes of internet usage, the majority of respondents engage in various activities. Approximately 65% use the internet to read news and access information, while 85.6% use it for communication with friends and family through platforms such as WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, Messenger, and others. Furthermore, 73.2% of respondents use the internet for watching videos and listening to music, 36.2% for video games, 83.1% to access social networks like Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, and others, and 79.4% for work and school-related purposes. A smaller proportion of respondents, 12.4%, use the Internet for other purposes not specifically mentioned.

Respondents exhibit similar patterns in Internet usage purposes regardless of their gender, settlement type and size, living arrangements, education, employment status, and the education and employment status of their parents. However, a notable difference is observed in the use of the Internet for video games and other purposes based on gender. Male respondents are more likely to use the Internet for video games, with 55.6% of them engaging in this activity, compared to 23% of female respondents. Additionally, 18.8% of male respondents and 7.8% of female respondents use the Internet for other purposes not specifically mentioned.

Regarding virtual private networks (VPN), the majority of respondents (74.1%) are familiar with their existence. Out of those, 61.5% have actually used a VPN. The reasons for using VPNs vary among the

respondents, with 38.1% using them to protect their location on social media, 48% using them to access regionally restricted content, and 22.2% using them for increased independence and privacy. Some respondents (6%) use VPNs because their friends use them, while others (14.7%) value the ability to keep the sites they visit private. Furthermore, 18.3% use VPNs to access blocked websites or apps at home or school, and 24.6% have other reasons for using VPNs.

The purpose of using VPN

An interesting finding from this research is that the use of VPNs is nearly equal among respondents residing in urban and rural areas. However, a higher proportion of male respondents (83%) reported using a VPN than female respondents (66.8%). Overall, similar trends in the usage of VPNs among respondents were observed regardless of the type and size of the settlement, living arrangements, education, employment status, and the education and employment status of their parents, although there were some minor variations.

In summary, the findings of this survey indicate that the vast majority of respondents have access to the Internet. Internet is primarily utilised for communication through various platforms, accessing social networks, and for work and school purposes. Additionally, respondents reported using the Internet for activities such as watching videos and listening to music. Moreover, many participants demonstrated awareness of VPNs, with a considerable majority reporting usage. These results suggest a high level of digital socialisation among the participants, including the noteworthy utilisation of VPNs.

Political issues

From the end of the war in June 1999 until the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo was under UN administration. During this period, the UNMIK held executive powers in the areas of justice and law enforcement institutions, as well as international affairs. Other competencies were gradually transferred to

local authorities. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence, the EU became involved through the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). EULEX aimed to assist Kosovo in establishing rule of law institutions, including judicial and law enforcement bodies. Subsequently, after the declaration of independence, Kosovo authorities established key institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Intelligence Agency, and the Kosovo Security Force, which in 2019 gained the legal mandate to become the armed forces. Kosovo has held numerous municipal and national elections since its first municipal elections in October 2000, establishing a strong tradition of free and democratic elections. However, voter turnout in these elections has typically remained below 50%, with the exception of those held in 2001.[16]

Kosovo has a vibrant civil society sector[17] with more than 10,000 registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and well-established media scene, with more than 108 licensed radio stations and around 100 TV channels.[18]

Against this background, the research on political issues encompasses issues related to the participation in elections, levels of trust in state government bodies, local government, the police, the army, the judiciary, the media, religious leaders, political parties, and NGOs. The research also examines the perceptions of participants on different foreign influences and assesses their level of agreement with the government's foreign policy towards Palestine, Ukraine, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Regarding the respondents' participation in elections, the research findings indicate that a portion of them have actively exercised their voting rights. Specifically, 36.9% of respondents reported voting in all elections they were eligible for, while 10.2% participated in the majority of elections. On the other hand, 5.8% of respondents voted in a limited number of elections, and 28.2% never voted. Additionally, 9% of respondents were below the voting age (18 years old) and thus did not have the right to vote, while 6.1% responded that they do not know. It is worth noting that no significant differences were observed among respondents based on gender, living conditions, or their parents' education and employment status.

Participation in elections

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
[16] Central Election Commission of Kosovo, Kosovo Assembly Elections, https://kqz-ks.org/an/kosovo-assembly-elections/

[17] See for example, Dren Puka, Kosovo Civil Society Index 2018, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation, Prishtina.

[18] Kosovo Independent Media Commission, Register of Radio and TV terrestrial, 2023, and Registration of TV through Distribution Operators, 2023, https://www.kpm-ks.org/en/telicencuarit/306/llojet-e-licencave/306

On further analysis, the research results indicate that respondents from urban areas exhibit a higher level of participation in elections compared to those from rural areas. Among respondents from urban areas, 43.5% reported voting in all elections, while 11% participated in the majority of elections. In contrast, the corresponding figures for respondents from rural areas were 32.6% and 8.5% respectively.

Furthermore, the level of education appears to have an impact on participation in elections. Respondents with bachelor's degrees demonstrated the highest level of participation, with 44.1% reporting voting in all elections and 13% participating in the majority. Similarly, respondents with MA and Ph.D. degrees displayed a high level of participation, with 77.8% voting in all elections and 11.1% participating in the majority.

However, when considering the respondents' parents' education level, no clear correlation with election participation emerges, as the results are more varied. Notably, the lowest level of participation in elections among participants was observed among the unemployed, with 48% reporting having never participated. Concerning trust in government bodies, similar patterns of trust among respondents are noted regardless of their settlement, gender, living arrangements, and the education and employment status of their parents. The percentage of participants who generally or fully trust in comparison with those who generally or fully distrust is almost the same.

Trust in the state government bodies

Another interesting finding is that the trust in state government bodies among respondents increases with their level of education. In this regard, the highest level of trust is noted among those with MA and Ph.D. degrees, with 55.65% generally trusting the state government bodies. Similarly, respondents with bachelor/graduate degrees exhibit a higher level of trust, with 37.0% generally trusting and 9.1% fully trusting. The same trend of trust is observed concerning employment status, where the unemployed show the lowest level of trust, with 29% generally trusting and 0% fully trusting.

Against this backdrop, similar patterns among respondents are also noted regarding trust in local government bodies. 41.9% of respondents generally or fully trust these institutions, while 44.7% generally or fully distrust them. These trends remain consistent regardless of respondents' settlements, gender, and living arrangements. It should be also noted that a clear correlation has not been found between

respondents' level of education, employment status, and the education and employment status of their parents in relation to trust in local government bodies.

Trust in the local government bodies

On the other hand, respondents generally express higher levels of trust in the police compared to state and local government bodies. According to the research findings, 45.9% of respondents generally trust the police, 31.5% trust them fully, 14.0% generally distrust, and 5.3% fully distrust. These trends of trust remain consistent among respondents regardless of their settlement, gender, living arrangements, education level, employment status, and their parents' level of education and employment status.

Trust in the police

Furthermore, the research reveals an even higher level of trust among respondents in the army of Kosovo. According to the findings, 52.9% of respondents fully trust the army, 36.9% generally trust it, 4.6% generally distrust, and 2.3% fully distrust it.

Regarding trust in the judiciary, the research data indicates that the trust level is similar to that of state and local government bodies. Among the respondents, 45.6% trust the judiciary either generally or fully, while 47.4% distrust it either generally or fully. However, it is noteworthy that trust in the judiciary is slightly higher among participants from rural areas (50% generally trust or fully trust) compared to those from urban areas (43.2%). An interesting finding is that female respondents exhibit higher levels of trust (51.4% generally trust or fully trust) compared to male respondents (41% generally trust or fully trust). These patterns of trust in the judiciary are observed despite variations in settlement, gender, and living arrangements among the participants.

On the other hand, respondents' trust in the media is significantly lower, with only 23.7% of them expressing general or full trust in the media. Interestingly, participants from rural areas exhibit slightly higher levels of trust in the media, with 27.3% expressing general or full trust, compared to 21.7% among those from urban areas.

Trust in the media

Furthermore, these low levels of trust in the media, with some variations, are observed among participants irrespective of their gender, education, employment status, as well as the education level and employment status of their parents. This indicates that trust in the media is generally low across different demographic groups and is not significantly influenced by these factors.

In contrast, respondents exhibit a considerable level of trust in religious leaders. Approximately 41.3% generally trust them, while 21.17% fully trust them. On the other hand, 17.6% generally distrust them, 11.7% fully distrust them, and 7.7% are uncertain. Interestingly, participants generally express a similar level of trust in religious leaders across various demographics such as gender, living arrangements and employment status.

Trust in the religious leaders

However, there are some notable variations depending on education level. For instance, those with MA and Ph.D. degrees display higher trust (33.1% generally trust and 11% fully trust). Similarly, individuals with incomplete or completed primary school exhibit a relatively high level of trust (66.7% generally trust and 33.3% fully trust). Lastly, trust in religious leaders is not significantly influenced by their parents' education and employment status. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that trust in religious leaders is higher among respondents from rural areas (74% generally or fully trust) than urban ones (56.8% generally or fully trust).

On the other hand, political parties receive the lowest levels of trust from respondents, with only 11.8% expressing general trust and 2.8% expressing full trust in them. These low levels of trust are observed across various demographics, including settlements, gender, living arrangements, employment status, level of education, and their parents' employment status and level of education. These research results highlight a general trend of scepticism towards political parties among the participants.

Trust in the political parties

On the other hand, respondents exhibit a significantly higher level of trust in NGOs compared to political parties. Among the participants, 36.9% generally trust and 9% fully trust NGOs, while 22.9% generally distrust and 13.0% fully distrust them. Additionally, 19.1% of respondents are unsure or do not have an opinion regarding their trust in these organizations.

It is worth noting that NGOs are viewed with greater trust by respondents from rural areas, with 49.3% expressing either general or full trust, compared to 34.3% among those from urban areas. Moreover, female respondents display higher levels of trust in NGOs, with 49.3% generally or fully trusting them, while the figure for male respondents is slightly lower at 42.6%. These findings highlight the relatively stronger trust in NGOs among certain demographic segments within the survey participants.

Trust in Non-Governmental Organizations

Similar trends of trust in NGOs are observed among respondents, with some variations, regardless of their living arrangements and employment status, as well as their parents' employment status. However, there is an interesting variation concerning the trust in NGOs and the education level of respondents and their parents.

On the other hand, the research data indicates that trust in NGOs tends to increase with the level of education of both the respondents and their parents. This means that respondents with higher levels of education and those whose parents have higher levels of education are more likely to express trust in NGOs. The specific percentages and variations in trust levels can be further analysed based on the education levels of the respondents and their parents to provide a more detailed understanding of the relationship between education and trust in NGOs.

The research examined the perceptions and attitudes of respondents toward foreign influences from several countries, including the EU, the United States (US), Russia, China, and Israel. By focusing on these specific countries, the study aimed to understand how respondents perceive and evaluate the impact and influence of these nations.

Against this backdrop, Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership and signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in October 2015.[19] Kosovo also maintains strong relations with the US.[20] Furthermore, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel on 1 February 2021, Kosovo opened an embassy in Jerusalem in March 2021.[21] In contrast, Russia strongly opposes Kosovo's independence,[22] and China does not recognise the country, although it has some economic relations.[23] In this vein, the research data provides insights into the respondents' level of agreement or disagreement with the foreign policy of their government towards these countries and their overall perception of foreign influences in their country.

According to the research findings, a significant proportion of respondents perceive a high level of influence from the EU. Specifically, 46.3% of respondents believe there is a lot of influence from the EU, while an additional 36.6% think there is some level of influence. A smaller percentage, 2.5%, perceives no influence from the EU, while 3.1% perceive it as inexistent. Lastly, 11.5% of respondents indicated that they don't know or are unsure about the level of influence from the EU.

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[19] Council of the European Union, Press Release, Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between European Union and Kosovo signed, 27 October 2015.

[20] U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, History of the U.S. and Kosovo, https://xk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/history/

[21] The Times of Israel, With diplomatic ties established, Kosovo opens embassy in Jerusalem, 14 March 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-diplomatic-ties-established-kosovo-opens-embassy-in-jerusalem/

[22] For further exploration, see: Lulzim Peci, Russia's Information Warfare Towards Kosovo: Political Background and Manifestation, Special Policy Brief, KIPRED, February 2021, https://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Russia_-_Kosovo_Political_Background_-_Eng_-_Fin_616233.pdf

[23] For further details, see: European Council for Foreign Relations, Mapping China's Rise in the Western Balkans: Kosovo, https://ecfr.eu/special/china-balkans/kosovo/

Interestingly, the research findings reveal that respondents from urban areas tend to have a higher perception of the EU's influence compared to those from rural areas. Among urban respondents, 48% perceive a lot of influence, and 39.7% perceive some influence from the EU. In contrast, among rural respondents, 43.3% perceive a lot of influence, and 31.2% perceive some influence.

Additionally, the data indicates that male respondents tend to perceive a higher level of influence from the EU compared to female respondents. Among males, 53.5% perceive a lot of influence, and 36.3% perceive some influence, while among females, 42.2% perceive a lot of influence, and 38.1% perceive some influence.

However, it is worth noting that similar levels of perception, with slight variations, regarding the high level of influence from the EU are observed among respondents regardless of their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status. These findings suggest that these factors do not strongly influence the perception of the EU's influence and is relatively consistent across different demographic groups.

The research findings indicate that respondents perceive a very high level of influence from the US. Among the participants, 55.6% believe that there is a lot of influence from the US, while 30.5% think there is some influence. Only a small percentage, 2.6%, believe there is no influence, and 1.5% believe there is no influence. Additionally, 9.7% of the respondents reported that they do not know. These findings highlight that most respondents perceive substantial influence from the US.

Similarly, the research findings show that there is a slightly higher level of cumulative perception regarding the influence from the US among respondents from urban areas. Among these respondents, 59.2% perceive a lot of influence, and 29.6% perceive some influence from the US. On the other hand, among respondents from rural areas, 49.3% perceive a lot of influence, and 32.1% perceive some influence.

Furthermore, male respondents display a higher perception of influence from the US compared to female respondents. Among males, 66.0% perceive a lot of influence, and 26.3% perceive some influence, whereas among females, 49.8% perceive a lot of influence, and 33.5% perceive some influence.

However, it is worth noting that despite these variations based on living arrangements, gender, and other factors, the overall perception of a high level of influence from the US remains consistent among the respondents. This perception is observed regardless of their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

Contrary to the perceptions of influence from the US, the research findings indicate that respondents have a different perspective on Russia's influence. Only 6.3% of the respondents believe that Russia has a lot of influence, while 22.7% believe it has some influence. On the other hand, 29.5% believe that Russia does not have any influence, 13.6% believe it has no influence at all, and 27.9% responded that they do not know.

Interestingly, respondents from urban areas perceive Russia's influence slightly higher than those from rural areas. Among urban respondents, 24.5% perceive some influence from Russia, while 5.7% believe it has a lot of influence. Among rural respondents, 19.6% perceive some influence, and 7.2% believe it has a lot of influence.

The research findings indicate that respondents have similar perceptions regarding China's influence. Only 3.9% of respondents believe that China has a lot of influence, while 13.3% think it has some influence. On the other hand, 34.7% of respondents believe that China has no influence, and 15.4% believe it has no influence at all. A significant portion of respondents, 32.6%, are unsure and do not have a clear opinion on the matter. These perceptions show similarities to the findings regarding Russia's influence, suggesting that respondents may perceive China and Russia in a similar light when it comes to their influence.

Influence from China

However, it is worth noting that respondents from urban areas (15% yes, 5.3% a lot) tend to perceive China's influence to a greater extent than those from rural areas (10.2% yes, 1.5% a lot). Similarly, female respondents (15.1% yes, 3.2% a lot) generally have a higher perception of China's influence compared to male respondents (11.3% yes, 1.5% a lot).

Interestingly, while there are some variations in perceptions based on urban/rural residence and gender, the overall perceptions of China's influence remain relatively consistent among respondents regardless of their living arrangements, employment status, and the employment status of their parents. However, it is noteworthy that respondents with MA or Ph.D. degrees (33.3% yes) and those whose mothers hold the same degrees (33% yes) tend to have a higher perception of China's influence.

These findings suggest that factors such as urban/rural residence, gender, and educational attainment may contribute to variations in perceptions of China's influence among respondents. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents maintain similar perceptions with minor deviations across various demographic groups and circumstances.

Similarly, the research data indicates that respondents' perceptions of Israel's influence are very similar to those of Russia and China. A relatively small percentage of respondents (4.7%) believe that there is a lot of influence from Israel, while 12.2% acknowledge its influence to some extent. A significant portion of respondents (28.4%) perceive no influence from Israel, and 17.2% believe there is no influence at all. A considerable number of respondents (37.5%) expressed uncertainty or a lack of knowledge regarding Israel's influence.

Interestingly, male respondents tend to have higher perceptions of Israel's influence, with 15.8% acknowledging its influence to some extent and 6.6% perceiving a lot of influence. In comparison, female respondents exhibit lower perceptions, with 10.0% acknowledging its influence to some extent and 2.3% perceiving a lot of influence.

Nevertheless, the majority of respondents hold similar views about Israel's influence, with minor variations, regardless of their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

When examining respondents' views on Kosovo's foreign policy in relation to Palestine, Ukraine, Syria, and Afghanistan, it is important to note that Palestine supported Serbia during NATO's military intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and strongly opposes the independence of Kosovo; [24] while Ukraine has not officially recognised Kosovo, Kosovo's government has supported Ukraine and joined international sanctions against Russia since the aggression in February 2022;[25] Afghanistan was one of the first countries to recognise the independence of Kosovo;[26] and, the Assad regime in Syria does not recognise the independence of Kosovo. These factors play a significant role in shaping Kosovo's foreign policy positions.

Against this background, in relation to Palestine, the majority of respondents hold a neutral stance, with a slightly higher cumulative percentage of those who disagree (18.1% disagree, 4.9% strongly disagree) compared to those who agree (11.4% agree, 6.5% strongly agree) with Kosovo's foreign policy.

Similarly, respondents from rural areas (5.1% strongly disagree, 22.5% disagree) exhibit a higher level of disagreement compared to those from urban areas (4.8% strongly disagree, 15.7% disagree) regarding Kosovo's foreign policy towards Palestine. However, it is worth noting that the majority of respondents, with

[24] San Francisco Chronicle, "Palestinian Authority Invites Milosevic to Bethlehem for Christmas", 2 December 1999, https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/palestinian-authority-invites-milosevic-to-2893451.php

[25] See, for example: European Pravda, "Kosovo Joined Latest EU Sanctions against Russia and Belarus", 26 July 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/26/7166506/

[26] BalkanInsight, U.S. Afghanistan Acknowledge Kosovo's Independence, 18 February,2008, https://balkaninsight.com/2008/02/18/us-afghanistan-acknowledge-kosovo-independence/

some minor variations, share these perceptions regardless of their living conditions, education level, employment status, and their parents' level of education and employment status.


Foreign policy regarding Palestine

When examining the respondents' perceptions of Kosovo's foreign policy towards Ukraine, slightly different views have been observed. While the majority of respondents (50.6%) hold a neutral stance, there is a higher level of agreement compared to disagreement among them. Specifically, 21.0% agree and 13.0% strongly agree, while 11.4% disagree and 3.9% strongly disagree with Kosovo's foreign policy towards Ukraine.

Foreign policy regarding Ukraine

In this context, it is worth noting that there is a higher overall agreement among respondents from urban areas (15.0% strongly agree, 23.1% agree) compared to those from rural areas (9.4% strongly agree, 17.4% agree). Additionally, male respondents exhibit a higher cumulative agreement (20.9% agree, 19.6% strongly agree) than female respondents (21.9% agree, 8.2%). It is interesting to observe that the majority of respondents, with minor variations, express agreement with Kosovo's foreign policy, regardless of their living arrangements (excluding those living with their mother), level of education, employment status, and the education (excluding those whose mother has uncompleted or completed primary school) and employment status of their parents.

When it comes to the views on Syria, the majority of respondents (59%) hold a neutral stance. However, there is a relatively balanced distribution of agreement (14.5% agree, 4.4% disagree) and disagreement (16.9% disagree, 5.2% strongly disagree) among the respondents. It is worth noting that male respondents exhibit a slightly higher cumulative agreement (18.4% agree, 5.9% strongly agree) compared to female respondents (12.3% agree, 2.7% strongly agree).


Indeed, among the majority of respondents, there are similar trends regarding their views on Kosovo's foreign policy towards Syria, with some minor deviations. These trends persist regardless of factors such as their place of residence, living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and the education and employment status of their parents. While there may be slight variations among different demographic groups, the general patterns of perception remain consistent.

Similarly, participants' perceptions of Kosovo's foreign policy towards Afghanistan show similar trends, with the majority (59.0%) holding a neutral stance. The cumulative agreement (14.5% agree, 5.2% strongly agree) slightly outweighs the cumulative disagreement (15.8% disagree, 5.2% strongly disagree), but the differences are relatively minor. These general perceptions are consistent among the participants, indicating a shared viewpoint on Kosovo's foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

There has been a slightly higher level of disagreement observed among respondents from rural areas (17.4% disagree, 5.8% strongly disagree) compared to those from urban areas (15.0% disagree, 4.9% strongly disagree). Additionally, female respondents have shown a slightly higher level of cumulative disagreement (17.3% disagree, 6.4% strongly disagree) compared to male respondents (14.5% disagree, 3.3% strongly disagree).

However, no other significant correlations have been found between disagreement and agreement among participants based on their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and their parents' level of education and employment status.

In conclusion, the survey results highlight the varying levels of trust among the respondents towards different institutions in Kosovo.

State government bodies, local government bodies, and the judiciary were generally perceived with moderate levels of trust, indicating a certain level of confidence in their ability to govern and provide justice. The police and the army enjoyed the highest levels of trust, suggesting that respondents had a lot of faith in their ability to maintain security and their institutional integrity.

Interestingly, the data suggests that religious leaders in Kosovo enjoyed a high level of trust among the respondents, with their level of trust ranking after the army and the police. This finding highlights the significant influence and credibility that religious leaders hold in the eyes of the population.

On the other hand, the level of trust in the media outlets was relatively low, indicating scepticism towards their credibility and objectivity. Political parties received the lowest level of trust among the surveyed institutions, reflecting a significant lack of confidence in their ability to represent and serve the interests of the people. The NGOs were viewed more positively, with a higher level of trust placed in their integrity and impact. This suggests that respondents saw them as influential and reliable actors in the societal and humanitarian spheres.

The findings of the survey indicate that there are varying perceptions of foreign influences among the respondents in Kosovo. Notably, the EU was perceived to have the highest level of influence among the respondents, with a significant percentage believing that it has a lot of influence. This perception may be influenced by Kosovo's aspirations for EU integration and the EU's involvement in various aspects of governance and development in the country. The US was also perceived to have a very high level of influence, with a considerable portion of respondents believing that it has a lot of influence. This perception may stem from the historical and political ties between Kosovo and the US, as well as the latter's involvement in supporting Kosovo's independence and post-conflict development. On the other hand, perceptions of influence from Russia, China, and Israel were relatively lower compared to the EU and the US. This may reflect the different geopolitical dynamics and relationships that Kosovo has with these countries.

Regarding Kosovo's stance on Palestine, Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan the findings highlight the diverse perspectives among the respondents. In this vein, Palestine, the majority of respondents expressed a neutral position, while there was a slightly higher level of disagreement compared to agreement with Kosovo's foreign policy. This suggests a diversity of opinions and potentially reflects the complexity and sensitivity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the case of Ukraine, there was a higher level of agreement than disagreement among the respondents, indicating a generally positive perception of Kosovo's foreign policy towards Ukraine. This could be influenced by factors of alignment of interests between the two countries.

Concerning Syria and Afghanistan, the majority of respondents held a neutral stance, while the levels of agreement and disagreement were relatively balanced. This indicates a lack of strong consensus among the respondents regarding Kosovo's foreign policy towards Syria and Afghanistan.

Education, culture and leisure opportunities

In this section, we will analyse respondents' views regarding various elements related to education, culture, and leisure opportunities. The survey aimed to understand the perceptions and experiences of participants in these areas.

Concerning satisfaction with their friends, most respondents indicated that they are either very satisfied (39.7%) or dissatisfied (39.2%). Additionally, 13.4% reported being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, while 3.5% expressed dissatisfaction and 3.7% stated dissatisfaction. These satisfaction levels were observed among most respondents irrespective of their background or their parents'.

On the other hand, regarding spending time with friends, 52.4% of the respondents reported often going out with friends, 46.1% stated doing so sometimes, and only 1.5% claimed to never go out with friends. In light of this information, it is noteworthy that male respondents (63.5%) tend to go out with friends more frequently than their female counterparts (44.1%). Additionally, individuals in urban areas (55.5%) reported going out more often than those in rural areas (49.6%). Despite minor deviations, similar levels of socialising were observed among most respondents, regardless of their own or parents' backgrounds.

Interestingly, the research data shows that almost all respondents have a habit of listening to music. The majority (83.5%) reported listening to music often, while a smaller proportion (15.3%) mentioned doing it so sometimes. These listening patterns were found to be consistent among most participants, irrespective of their own or their parents' backgrounds.

On the other hand, distinct patterns emerge among respondents when it comes to reading books and magazines. Among the participants, 53.4% reported reading books and magazines sometimes, while 36.0% stated doing so often. Interestingly, 10.6% of the respondents indicated that they never engage in reading books or magazines.

Notably, a noteworthy finding is that respondents from rural areas (40.3%) displayed a higher frequency of reading books and magazines compared to those from urban areas (33.6%). Additionally, female respondents (40.3%) were more inclined towards reading than their male counterparts (32.2%). These differences in reading habits based on geographical location and gender provide valuable insights into the preferences and behaviours of the respondents.


In this regard, no clear correlation has been identified between the level of reading and the respondents' level of education, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status. The data suggests that these factors do not strongly influence reading habits.

When it comes to participating in sports activities, the data reveals that only a small percentage (15.3%) of the respondents declared themselves as inactive, while the majority (58.5%) reported engaging in sports sometimes, and a significant portion (26.1%) mentioned participating in sports often.

However, a notable gender difference is evident. Male respondents (40.9%) displayed a significantly higher level of sports participation compared to female respondents (15.5%). This finding highlights a disparity in sports engagement based on gender.

On the other hand, the data did not indicate any significant correlation between the frequency of sports participation and respondents' living arrangements, level of education and employment status, or their parents' education and employment status. These factors do not have a substantial influence on individuals' sports involvement.

Regarding the frequency of watching TV among respondents, the data reveals that 34.0% of the participants reported watching TV frequently, while a majority of 53.7% mentioned watching it sometimes. Notably, 12.3% of the respondents stated that they never watch TV.

An interesting finding is that female respondents (37.9%) reported a higher frequency of TV watching compared to their male counterparts (29.3%). This indicates a gender disparity in TV viewing habits. These statistics shed light on the preferences and behaviours of the respondents in relation to TV consumption, with a higher proportion of females indicating a more frequent engagement with television.

Watching TV

On the other hand, it is observed that similar trends, with minor deviations, are noted among all respondents, irrespective of their settlements, level of education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status. This suggests that the patterns of TV viewing habits remain relatively consistent across different demographic groups, and these factors do not have a significant impact on the overall trends observed.

Regarding the use of the Internet for web search purposes, the data indicates that the vast majority of respondents (88.2%) reported using it often. A smaller proportion (11.3%) mentioned using it sometimes, while only a negligible percentage (0.3%) claimed to never use it for web searches.

Interestingly, the analysis did not uncover any notable differences in the frequency of web search usage based on various factors such as settlements, gender, living arrangements, level of education and employment status, and the education and employment status of their parents. This suggests that the frequency of Internet and web search use is consistent among respondents across different demographic groups.

Use of Internet

The research data reveals that a majority of respondents (68.8%) have been involved in volunteering or unpaid work, while 30.4% have not engaged in such activities. Moreover, slight differences in involvement are observed based on geographical location and gender. Specifically, respondents from urban areas (70.0%) show a slightly higher level of involvement in volunteering or unpaid work compared to those from rural areas (66.9%). Additionally, male respondents (73.4%) exhibit a higher level of involvement compared to their female counterparts (64.3%).

Involvement in volunteering work or unpaid jobs

In contrast to the level of involvement in volunteering or unpaid work, the participation level of respondents in their community's public activities is considerably lower. Only 32.4% of the respondents have participated in such activities, while a majority of 67.6% have not.

Furthermore, there are slight differences in participation based on geographical location and gender. Respondents from urban areas (34.5%) exhibit a slightly higher level of participation in community activities compared to those from rural areas (28.75%). Additionally, male respondents (39.15%) show a higher level of participation compared to their female counterparts (25.7%).

Participation in public activities in the local community

An interesting finding from the research data is the presence of a negative correlation between the level of respondents' education and their participation in community public activities, with the exception noted in the category of those with unfinished or finished primary school. This suggests that, as the level of education increases, the likelihood of participating in community activities tends to decrease. On the other hand, the research data reveals that 29.8% of the respondents have

supported persons with special needs, the elderly, or children, while a majority of 70.2% have never engaged in such support.

On the other hand, the research data indicates that among rural respondents, there is a higher level of support for persons with special needs, the elderly, or children, with 35.1% of rural respondents engaging in such support. In contrast, among urban respondents, the level of support is slightly lower at 26.8%. Additionally, female respondents (32.9%) demonstrate a higher level of support compared to male respondents (26.4%). These findings suggest that rural respondents and female respondents tend to be more involved in supporting persons with special needs, the elderly, or children.

Similar behaviour patterns have been observed among participants regarding their participation in the organisation of sports events. The research data reveals that 23.3% of the respondents have actively participated in the organisation of sports events, while the majority, 76.3%, has not been involved in such activities. This finding indicates that a significant proportion of the respondents have not taken part in organizing sports events.

In this regard, it has been observed that there is a much higher participation rate in the organisation of sports events among respondents from rural areas, with 31.5% of rural respondents engaging in such activities, compared to 18.5% among urban respondents. Similarly, male respondents (31.8%) demonstrate higher participation compared to female respondents (16.4%).

Even lower levels of participation have been noted among respondents regarding the organisation of cultural events. The research data indicates that only 17.6% of the respondents have been involved in organising cultural events, while a significant majority of 82.4% has not participated in such activities.

The research data reveals that among respondents from rural areas, participation in the organisation of cultural events is significantly lower, with only 12.8% of rural respondents engaging in such activities, compared to 20.2% among urban respondents. Additionally, participation among female respondents (18.6%) is slightly higher than among male respondents (15.5%). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that similar patterns of participation in the organisation of cultural events, with some deviations due to small sample sizes in certain categories, have been noted regardless of respondents' living arrangements, level of education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

Concerning supporting colleagues in learning, the research data reveals a relatively low level of solidarity among respondents. Only 32.8% of the respondents have actively supported their colleagues in learning, while a majority of 65.6% has not engaged in such support.

On the other hand, the research data reveals that female respondents exhibit a significantly higher level of support for their colleagues in learning, with 40.7% of them engaging in such support compared to 23.6% among male respondents. Moreover, it is interesting to note that similar patterns of support for colleagues in learning, with some deviations due to small sample sizes in certain categories, have been observed regardless of respondents' living arrangements, level of education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

Interestingly, the research data reveals a very low level of participation in religious activities among the respondents, with only 14.9% of them actively engaging in such activities, while a majority of 84.7% have not participated. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that higher levels of participation have been observed among respondents from rural areas, with 19.1% of rural respondents engaging in religious activities compared to 12.5% among urban respondents. Similarly, male respondents (16.4) exhibit higher participation rates than female respondents (12.1%). Moreover, regarding living arrangements, respondents who live alone with their mother, father, or partner/spouse tend to have minimal or no participation in religious activities.

Religious activities

On the other hand, the research data does not reveal any significant correlation between participation in religious activities and the respondents' settlements, level of education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status. This finding suggests that factors such as the respondents' living arrangements, educational background, and employment status do not strongly influence their participation in religious activities. The decision to engage in religious activities seems to be more individual and personal, not necessarily linked to specific demographic or socioeconomic factors.

The research data reveals that respondents' participation in NGOs' activities is slightly higher than their participation in activities of religious character. Approximately 25% of the respondents have participated in NGOs' activities, while a majority of 75% have not engaged in such activities.

Activities of Non-Governmental Organizations

On the other hand, the research data shows that higher levels of participation in NGOs' activities have been observed among respondents from urban areas, with 31.0% of urban respondents engaging in such activities, compared to 21.3% among rural respondents. Similarly, male respondents (31.8%) exhibit higher participation rates than female respondents (24.3%). Against this background, the research data suggests that

similar patterns of participation in NGOs' activities have been observed across various demographic categories, with some deviations due to small sample sizes.

Regardless of respondents' living arrangements, level of education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status, the overall participation rates in NGOs' activities remain relatively consistent. This indicates that factors such as living arrangements, educational background, and parental influence may not have a significant impact on the decision to engage in these activities.

In conclusion, this section brings forward the fact that satisfaction with friends, going out with friends, listening to music, reading books/magazines, and participating in sports were quite common activities among the respondents. Furthermore, the study highlighted the widespread use of the internet and web search among the respondents, indicating its importance as a popular activity. Also, the analyses show that a notable percentage of respondents reported engaging in volunteering or unpaid work, supporting persons with special needs/the elderly/children, and participating in NGOs' activities. On the other hand, participation in community public activities, religious activities, and the organisation of cultural events showed relatively lower levels of involvement among the respondents. These activities displayed variations based on demographic factors, such as urban or rural residence and gender.

Transnational dynamics

The research on transnational dynamics covers respondents' opinions on various aspects of the impact of the diaspora. In this regard, Kosovo, with 1.8 million residents living in the country, has a very large diaspora consisting of roughly 800,000 individuals, primarily residing in Western Europe and the US. According to the Central Bank of Kosovo in 2022, the diaspora brought over three billion Euros to the country,[27] which has a strong impact on the economic situation in Kosovo.

Against this background, most of respondents, namely (40.9%) believe that diaspora has an extremely significant impact on society, while another significant portion (36.1%) considers the impact highly significant. These trends remain consistent among respondents regardless of their settlement, education, employment status, and parents' education and employment status, with only minor variations.

Diaspora's affect on society

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27 Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo, "Governor Mehmeti for Le Canton27.ch: The Kosovar diaspora last year brought 3 billion euros to Kosovo, Switzerland alone over 600 million CHF", 11 January 2023, https://bqk-kos.org/governor-mehmeti-for-le-canton27-ch-the-kosovar-diaspora-last-year-brought-3-billion-euros-to-kosovo-switzerland-alone-over-600-million-chf/?lang=en

However, it should be noted that the percentage of male respondents who selected "Extreme" and "High" as their response is higher compared to females. Specifically, 43.7% of males chose "Extreme" compared to 37.3% of females, while 39.3% of males chose "High" compared to 35.6% of females. In terms of respondents' living conditions, those who live alone (33.3%) and those who live with two parents (39.7%) represent the lowest percentages of respondents who believe that diaspora has an extreme impact on society, compared to other categories.

When it comes to how diaspora affects the lives of the respondents, there are significant differences in perceptions. The majority of respondents perceive the impact as medium (30.6%) or low (23.8%), while a smaller percentage perceive it as extreme (17.2%) or high (15.4%), and even fewer consider it negligible (12.9%).

In terms of the type of settlement, respondents from rural areas tend to believe that diaspora has a greater impact on their lives compared to those from urban areas. Specifically, the percentage of respondents from rural areas who perceive the impact as extreme is 19.4%, while for those from urban areas it is 15.9%. Similarly, for high impact, the percentages are 20.1% for rural respondents and 12.7% for urban respondents.

Females and males also differ in their perceptions of how diaspora affects their lives. A higher percentage of females (14.2%) perceive the impact as negligible compared to males (9.6%). Additionally, more females (27.6%) view the impact as low compared to males (19.1%). Both genders have relatively similar percentages for perceiving a medium impact, with females at 32.0% and males at 29.3%. However, more males (22.3%) see the impact as high compared to females (11.6%). Finally, in the extreme category, males (19.7%) have a slightly higher percentage than females (14.7%). These variations indicate potential differences in how genders perceive the influence of diaspora on their lives.

Affect of diaspora on the respondents' life

In general, respondents, regardless of their level of education and employment status, as well as their parents' education and employment status, show similar perceptions regarding the impact of diaspora on their lives, with some variations. This indicates that the perception of the diaspora's impact is not significantly influenced by educational attainment, employment status, or their parents' educational and employment backgrounds.

Regarding the connection between the diaspora and the resident population, the majority of respondents in this research believe that the connection is extreme (43.0%) or high (32.8%). A significant portion of respondents (19.3%) perceive the connection to be medium, while a smaller percentage consider it to be

low (4.1%) or negligible (0.8%). These results indicate that most respondents view the connection between the diaspora and the resident population as significant or substantial.


Interestingly, the respondents consider this connection higher in urban than rural areas. In urban areas, this connection is considered extreme by 45.2% and high by 34.1% of respondents, in contrast with rural areas, where it is considered extreme by 39.2% and high by 30.8%. On the other hand, 49% of male respondents consider this connection extreme in contrast to female respondents, of whom 37.5% have the same perception. In general, regardless of their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and parents' education and employment status, most respondents consider the diaspora's connection with the resident population either extreme or high.

Interestingly, respondents perceive the connection between the diaspora and the resident population higher in urban areas than rural areas. In urban areas, 45.2% of respondents consider the connection extreme, while 34.1% view it as high. In contrast, 39.2% of respondents in rural areas perceive the connection as extreme, and 30.8% view it as high. Furthermore, the perception of the connection differs between male and female respondents. Among male respondents, 49% consider the connection extreme, while 37.5% share the same perception among female respondents.

Regarding the impact of diaspora on the socioeconomic situation, the perceptions among respondents are even higher. A significant majority of respondents, 56.8%, consider the impact extreme, while 36% perceive it as high. These perceptions are even higher among urban respondents, with 60.3% considering the impact extreme and 24.6% viewing it as high. Among rural respondents, the percentages are slightly lower, with 50.7% perceiving the impact as extreme and 28.5% as high. There is also a notable difference in perceptions between male and female respondents. Among male respondents, 66.7% perceive the impact as extreme and 27.7% as high. Among female respondents, 49.1% consider the impact extreme, and 25.9% perceive it as high.

In contrast, the perceptions of the respondents regarding the impact of the diaspora on religious life are quite different. The majority of respondents (43.1%) believe that the diaspora has a negligible effect on religious life, while 30.5% perceive the impact to be low. A smaller percentage of respondents (17.0%) consider the impact to be medium, and an even smaller portion believe it to be high (4.8%) or extreme (4.6%).

These results indicate that the respondents generally perceive the influence of the diaspora on religious life to be minimal or low, with a significant percentage considering it to have a negligible impact. This suggests that the diaspora's impact on religious aspects is not perceived as highly significant or transformative by most respondents.

Diaspora's affect on religious life

An interesting finding is that the perception of the impact of diaspora on religious life is lower among respondents from rural areas than those from urban areas. Specifically, 50.3% of respondents from rural areas believe that the diaspora's impact on religious life is negligible, whereas only 39.0% of urban respondents share the same perception.

Regardless of various demographic factors, the vast majority of respondents believe that the diaspora has a significant impact on society, the connection with the resident population, and the socioeconomic situation. However, its influence on individual and religious life is relatively limited. These findings provide valuable insights into how the respondents perceive different aspects of the diaspora, highlighting the nuances and variations in their perspectives.

In conclusion, the research findings reveal interesting insights into the perceptions of respondents regarding the impact of the diaspora on various aspects of society. In this vein, the vast majority of respondents believe that the diaspora has a significant impact on society, the connection with the resident population, and the socioeconomic situation. On the other hand, the influence of the diaspora on individual and religious life is relatively limited.

THE INFLUENCE OF EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE ON THE DRIVER'S PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The research data shows that among the respondents, 20.3% of them have participated in physically violent conflicts with other young people in the neighbourhood/quarter where they reside. On the other hand, a

higher level of participation in this type of physically violent conflict has been observed among respondents from urban areas (22.4%) compared to those from rural areas (16.4%). Male respondents had a significantly higher participation rate (38.9%) than female respondents (6.5%). Interestingly, among respondents who identified as "Other", the participation rate was remarkably higher (83.3%).


The lowest percentage of participants in this type of physically violent conflict is found among those who live with their parents because it is the easiest solution for their family (14.6%). Conversely, the highest percentage of participants in physically violent conflicts is found among those who would have financial self-reliance and prefer to live by themselves (35.7%), but their parents are not supportive of the idea. Similarly, the same percentage (35.7%) is observed among those who would gladly live alone but face opposition from their parents. On the other hand, among the respondents who have their own room, a significantly higher level of participation (19%) has been noted compared to those who do not have their own room (6.7%).

Furthermore, no correlation has been found between the respondents' education level and their participation percentage in this physically violent conflict. However, an interesting finding is that the percentage of participation in physically violent conflicts shows a negative correlation with their mothers' education level. It tends to be higher among respondents whose mothers have higher levels of education, with the highest percentage observed among respondents whose mothers had a baccalaureate/graduate study or a master's or Ph.D. degree (30.8%). The percentage of participation in physically violent conflicts varies across different levels of education of the respondents' fathers, with higher percentages observed among respondents whose fathers have higher levels of education (33.3% for masters and Ph.D.).

Regarding the respondents' employment status, no correlation has been found between their employment status and the percentage of participation in this physically violent conflict. Similar patterns of a lack of correlation have been noted among respondents regardless of their mothers' and fathers' employment status. However, there is a clear negative correlation between job satisfaction and participation among respondents in this kind of conflict. 94.4% of respondents who are very satisfied and 77.0% who are satisfied with their jobs never participated in this kind of violent conflict, in comparison with those very dissatisfied out of whom 57.1% participated. On the other hand, a higher level of participation has been noted among participants looking for a job (22.2%) than those who are not (3.1%).

On the other hand, the participation among respondents in physically violent conflicts with other young people in a club or café is much lower, accounting for 9.1% of them. This percentage remains consistent among respondents from both urban and rural areas. However, male respondents have a significantly higher participation rate (16.1%) compared to female respondents (3.5%).

Participation in physically violent conflict with other young people in a club or in a café

In this regard, those who live with their parents because it is the easiest solution for their families have the lowest level of participation (6.1%), while those who have their own room exhibit a slightly higher level of participation (7.9%) compared to the other respective categories. Furthermore, no clear correlation has been observed between the level of participation among respondents and their level of education, employment status, or their parents' level of education. However, a notable negative correlation exists between the level of job satisfaction and the level of participation among respondents in this kind of conflict. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that there has been a higher level of participation among participants who are actively looking for a job compared to those who are not seeking employment.

Similar trends among participants have been noted in regard to their participation in physically violent conflicts in locations such as a sports hall or on a football pitch, with a participation rate of 11.8%. However, it is important to highlight that participation among male respondents (20.6%) is significantly higher than among female respondents (4.8%).

Participation in physically violent conflict in a sports hall, on a football pitch, etc.

The research data shows that among the participants, those who are living alone or with their friends/relatives and have financial self-reliance or a desire to live alone despite parental opposition tend to have higher levels of participation in this kind of conflict compared to other categories. Conversely, those without their own room have never participated in this kind of conflict. In terms of correlation, no significant relationship has been found between the level of participation among respondents and their own employment status, their parents' employment status, and their level of job satisfaction. However, there is a slightly higher level of participation among those who are actively looking for a job.

Regarding the level of education among respondents, a clear negative correlation has been observed with their level of participation. However, when examining the level of education of their parents, no overall correlation has been found with the level of participation among respondents, except for the finding that the highest level of participation is noted among those whose parents hold master's or Ph.D. degrees.

On the other hand, the research data shows a higher participation rate among respondents (20.8%) in physically violent conflicts occurring in school or university settings. Interestingly, the percentage of individuals reporting participation is slightly higher in urban settlements (22.0%) compared to rural settlements (18.6%). Moreover, male respondents (36.9%) exhibit a significantly higher participation rate compared to female respondents (8.7%) in these conflicts.

Similarly to other cases, the research data suggests that respondents who are living alone or with friends/relatives, and who desire financial independence or prefer living alone but face parental opposition, tend to have higher levels of participation in physically violent conflicts in school/university compared to other categories. Surprisingly, there is no difference in participation between respondents who have their own rooms and those who do not.

Furthermore, no correlation has been found between the level of participation among respondents and their own or their parents' employment status, as well as their level of job satisfaction. However, it is worth noting that there is a slightly higher participation level among respondents who are actively seeking employment.

Participation in physically violent conflict in school/at university

Regarding the level of education among respondents, there appears to be a clear negative correlation with their level of participation in physically violent conflicts. The participation level is lowest among those with master's and Ph.D. degrees (11.1%). On the other hand, when considering the level of education of their parents, there is a clear negative correlation with the level of participation among respondents. Interestingly, the highest level of participation is observed among respondents whose parents hold masters or Ph.D. degrees (26.9% mothers, 30.8% fathers).

The research data indicates that there is a very low level of participation among respondents in violent conflicts with young people of other political or religious convictions. Only 1.3% or 5 out of 397 respondents reported participation in such conflicts. This suggests that participation in this type of conflict among respondents is extremely rare, regardless of their living circumstances, job-seeking circumstances, job satisfaction, and their education and employment status, as well as the education and employment status of their parents.

Participation in physically violent conflict with young people of other political or religious convictions

Similarly, the research data reveals a negligible level of participation among respondents in physically violent conflicts with the police, with only 1.5% or 6 out of 397 respondents reporting such participation. It is worth noting that all of these respondents were from urban areas. This further emphasises that participation in this type of conflict among respondents is exceptionally rare, irrespective of their living circumstances, job-seeking circumstances, job satisfaction, education and employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

Participation in physically violent conflict with the police

The research data indicates a low level of participation among respondents in physically violent conflicts with their partners, with only 3% or 12 out of 396 respondents reporting such participation. Among these participants, the percentage is 2.8% for those from rural areas and 3.2% for those from urban areas. In terms of gender, the participation rate is 1.9% among male respondents and 3.1% among female respondents.

Participation in physically violent conflict with a partner

In conclusion, the findings of this research highlight the very low level of participation among respondents in various types of physically violent conflicts. The data reveals consistently low levels of participation across different contexts, including conflicts with other young people in the neighbourhood/quarter, conflicts in club or café settings, and conflicts in school/university. In contrast, participation in conflicts with individuals of different political or religious convictions, conflicts with the police, and conflicts with partners are very rare.

Importance of individual drivers

In this section, in order to measure their importance, the research respondents were asked to rank predefined drivers of VE on a scale from 1 (the most important) to 7 (the least important). These drivers include politics, economics, religion, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, culture and leisure, and the digital space.

In this regard, different views have been noted concerning the importance of politics as a driver of radicalisation among respondents. Nevertheless, the majority (57%) consider it an important driver, with the rankings as follows: 1 - 23.1%, 2 - 19.1%, and 3 - 15.1%. This majority is higher among respondents from urban areas (60.3%) than those from rural areas (52.2%). Similar agreement trends are observed among respondents regardless of their gender, living arrangements, level of education, and employment status, as well as their parents' education and employment status.

Regarding the driver of the economy, the cumulative majority among respondents think (66.5%, 1 - 27.1%, 2 – 23.9%, and 3 - 15.4%) that it is an important driver. When it comes to the types of settlements, there is almost no difference between perceptions among those from urban and rural areas. This percentage is slightly higher among females (68.5%) than male respondents (63.5%).

Driver: Politics - 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation


Similar trends of agreement regarding the importance of economics as a driver of radicalisation are indeed noted among respondents regardless of their gender, living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and the level of education and employment status of their parents.

Driver: Economics - 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

Regarding the driver of religion, a slight cumulative majority among respondents (51.2%) believe that it is an important driver, with the ranking as follows: 1 - 21.1%, 2 - 13.1%, and 3 - 17.1%. Interestingly, this percentage is slightly higher among respondents from rural areas (61.8%) compared to those from urban areas (45.2%). However, there is almost no difference in the percentage of views between female and male respondents.

Driver: Religion - 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

On the other hand, the research data has revealed a clear correlation between the importance of religion as a driver of radicalisation and the respondents' level of education. Notably, the cumulative percentage of those holding masters or Ph.D. degrees (75%) indicates a higher significance placed on religion as a driver of radicalisation among individuals with advanced education. However, no significant correlation has been found between the respondents' living arrangements, employment statuses, and the level of education and employment status of their parents with the importance of religion as a driver of radicalisation.

Concerning the driver of territorial inequalities, the respondents have assigned lower importance to it. A cumulative minority (36.0%) believe that territorial inequalities are an important driver, with the ranking as follows: 1 - 9.3%, 2 - 12.3%, and 3 - 14.4%. Interestingly, respondents' perceptions are almost equal regarding their settlements and gender, indicating similar views across different types of settlements and genders.

Driver: Territorial inequalities - 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

No correlation has been found between the respondents' living arrangements, employment statuses, and their parents' education and employment status with territorial inequalities' importance as a radicalisation driver. The data does not indicate any significant relationship between these factors and the perception of territorial inequalities as a driver of radicalisation.

Regarding the driver of transnational dynamics, the perceptions among the respondents are even lower, amounting to 26.2% in cumulative importance, with the ranking as follows: 1 - 5.9%, 2 - 9.4%, and 3 - 11.0%. Interestingly, cumulative perceptions among respondents on the importance of this driver are higher among those from urban areas (30.1%) compared to those from rural areas (19.3%). However, there is almost an equal perception between male and female respondents regarding the importance of transnational dynamics as a driver of radicalisation.

Transnational dynamics- 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

That is indeed an interesting finding from the research data. It suggests that the level of importance attributed to transnational dynamics as a driver of radicalisation decreases as respondents' level of education increases. On the other hand, no significant correlation has been found between the respondents' living arrangements, employment statuses, and their parents' education and employment statuses, with the importance of transnational dynamics as a driver of radicalisation. These factors do not significantly influence how respondents perceive the importance of transnational dynamics in radicalisation processes.

Culture and leisure- 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

According to the research data, the cumulative perceptions among respondents regarding the importance of the driver of culture and leisure amount to 35%, with the ranking as follows: 1 - 12.5%, 2 - 9.9%, and 3 - 13.1%. Interestingly, perceptions among respondents from rural areas (37.5) are higher compared to those from urban areas (34.3%), and among female respondents (36.3%) compared to male respondents (34.5%).

Additionally, the data reveals that there is no significant correlation between the respondents' living arrangements, employment statuses, and the education and employment statuses of their parents with the importance of culture and leisure as a driver of radicalisation. These factors do not appear to have a notable influence on how respondents perceive the importance of culture and leisure in the context of radicalisation.

Regarding the driver of digital space as a driver of radicalisation, the cumulative perception of its importance among participants is 32.0%, with the ranking as follows: 1 - 10.9%, 2 - 8.5%, and 3 - 12.5%. It is interesting to note that the cumulative perceptions among urban respondents (33.9%) are higher compared to rural respondents (28.7%). However, when considering gender, the perceptions are almost the same, indicating a similar level of importance attributed to digital space as a driver of radicalisation among both male and female participants.

Digital space- 1 the most important and 7 the least important driver of radicalisation

According to the research findings, no significant correlation has been identified between the respondents' living arrangements, employment statuses, and the education and employment statuses of their parents with the importance of digital space as a driver of radicalisation. These factors do not seem to have a significant influence on how participants perceive the importance of digital space in the context of radicalisation.

Based on the presented research data, a conclusion can be drawn regarding the cumulative importance among respondents concerning the drivers of VE. The findings indicate that the highest cumulative importance is attributed to the driver of economics, with 66.5% of respondents considering it as a significant factor. The driver of politics follows closely behind, with a cumulative importance of 57.0%. Religion is perceived as the third most important driver, with a cumulative importance of 51.2%.

In contrast, respondents assign relatively lower importance to the drivers of territorial inequalities, culture and leisure, and transnational dynamics. Territorial inequalities have a cumulative importance of 36.0%, while culture and leisure, as well as transnational dynamics, have lower cumulative importance with 35.0% and 26.3%, respectively.

Cumulative importance of the drivers of radicalisation

THE OPINION OF YOUNG PEOPLE ON PUBLIC POLICIES REGARDING PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In this section, the opinions of respondents regarding certain public policies related to the prevention of VE are analysed. These policies include religious education, state policies, actual measures that offer equal rights and resources for all citizens, monitoring social media, and freedom of expression and religion.

Against this background, the research data shows that the majority of respondents either agree (29.2%) or strongly agree (24.2%) that religious education can effectively contain and limit the risk of VE. Additionally, 32.6% remain neutral, 11.7% disagree, and 2.2% strongly disagree. The cumulative support for this matter is nearly equal among rural and urban respondents. However, when considering gender, male respondents exhibit higher support (34.0% agree and 27.5% strongly agree) compared to female respondents (27.1% agree and 22.0% strongly agree). Similar views are shared among respondents regardless of their living arrangements and level of education.

Religious education can effectively contain and limit the risk of violent extremism

Similar views among respondents, with some minor deviations, are shared regardless of their living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and the level of education and employment status of their parents.

Regarding the respondents' opinions on state policies and actual measures that offer equal rights and resources for all citizens, the views are divided. Among the respondents, 11.4% strongly agree, 28.6% agree, 45.6% are neutral, 11.7% disagree, and 2.7% strongly disagree.

State policies and actual measures that offer equal rights and resources for all citizens can effectively contain and limit the risk of violent extremism

Nevertheless, there is a higher level of agreement among urban respondents, with 30.9% agreeing and 12.8% strongly agreeing, compared to rural respondents, with 24.6% agreeing and 9.0% strongly agreeing. Similarly, among male respondents, there is a higher level of agreement, with 28.9% agreeing and 17.4% strongly agreeing, compared to female respondents, with 29.3% agreeing and 7.9% strongly agreeing. However, no clear correlation has been found among respondents between their level of agreement and their level of education, living arrangements, employment status, or their parents' education and employment status.

The research data shows that among the participants, the majority agree (33.8%) and strongly agree (17.5%) that monitoring social media can effectively contain and limit the risk of VE. Additionally, 31.4% remain neutral, 14.9% disagree, and 2.4% strongly disagree.

On the other hand, among respondents from urban areas, there is a higher level of agreement (35% agree and 19.5% strongly agree) compared to those from rural areas (30.1% agree and 14.0% strongly agree). Similarly, male respondents exhibit a higher level of agreement (37.5% agree and 23.0% strongly agree) compared to female respondents (32.2% agree and 14.7% strongly agree).

Furthermore, no clear correlation has been found among respondents regarding their level of agreement that monitoring social media can effectively contain and limit the risk of VE, and factors such as their level of education, living arrangements, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

On the other hand, the vast majority of respondents have declared that they practise their religion freely, with 61.4% strongly agreeing and 24.4% agreeing. Additionally, 9.3% hold neutral views, 3.1% disagree, and only 1.8% strongly disagree. Similar views, with some minor deviations, are shared among respondents regardless of their settlements, gender, living arrangements, level of education, employment status, and the level of education and employment status of their parents.

Regarding violent reactions experienced by respondents due to their religion, cumulatively, 13.5% (7.3% agree and 6.2% strongly agree) have reported experiencing such reactions. However, the vast majority of respondents (44.3% strongly disagree and 32.6% disagree) have not experienced violent reactions due to their religion, and there is a significant portion of respondents who hold neutral views.

I have experienced a violent reaction from someone because of my religion

On the other hand, there has been noted a higher level of agreement among urban respondents, with 8.9% agreeing and 6.1% strongly agreeing, compared to rural respondents, who also have 8.9% agreeing and 6.1% strongly agreeing. Similarly, male respondents exhibit a higher level of agreement, with 9.2% agreeing and 5.3% strongly agreeing, compared to female respondents, with 5.9% agreeing and 5.9% strongly agreeing. However, no clear correlation has been found among respondents regarding their level of agreement with the experience of violent reactions from someone because of their religion, in relation to their level of education, living arrangements, employment status, and their parents' education and employment status.

In conclusion, the research data presented in this section sheds light on the respondents' opinions regarding various factors related to religious education, state policies, monitoring social media, and experiencing violent reactions based on one's religion. The findings reveal both areas of agreement and divergence among the participants.

Firstly, a majority of respondents express support for the belief that religious education can effectively contain and limit the risk of VE. This indicates a perceived value in incorporating religious teachings as a means to address and mitigate extremist ideologies.

Secondly, opinions regarding state policies and actual measures offering equal rights and resources for all citizens are more divided among the respondents. While some express agreement, neutrality, or disagreement, there is no clear correlation between these viewpoints and factors such as level of education, living arrangements, employment status, or the education and employment status of their parents.

Thirdly, the notion of monitoring social media as a means to combat VE garners substantial support from the respondents. However, it is noteworthy that urban respondents and male participants tend to exhibit higher levels of agreement compared to their rural and female counterparts.

Lastly, when considering experiences of violent reactions based on one's religion, a minority of respondents report having personally encountered such incidents. However, the majority of participants assert that they have not faced violent reactions due to their religious beliefs.

Overall, the findings suggest that while certain trends emerge, such as higher agreement among urban respondents and male participants in specific areas, there is no consistent pattern between the respondents' perspectives and demographic variables or background characteristics.

It is important to note that this study provides valuable insights into the respondents' opinions on these topics, but further research and analysis are needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics underlying these viewpoints and their implications for policy-making and social interventions.

### The perceived importance of responses

In this section, the perceived importance of governmental responses to prevent radicalisation will be analysed. These responses include: political rights and representation, economic opportunities and employment, religious education, equal distribution of services and wealth within the country, addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims, offering opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces, and working on digital spaces and platforms. These responses had to be rated on a scale from 1 (the most important) to 9 (the least important) in terms of their effectiveness in preventing radicalisation.

Against this background, the research data shows that 72.8% of respondents cumulatively view the response of political rights as important in preventing radicalisation. The breakdown of the percentages for each response option is as follows: 23.7% for scale 1, 20.5% for scale 2, 15.4% for scale 3, and 13.2% for scale 4 of importance.

Political rights and representation - 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

The cumulative perception among urban respondents is higher at 74.6% compared to rural respondents at 69.6%. Similarly, female respondents have a higher cumulative perception at 75% compared to male respondents at 70.1%. Additionally, a clear correlation has been observed between the level of education and the level of perceived importance among respondents. However, it is worth noting that most respondents had similar perceptions with some deviations, regardless of their living arrangements, employment status, parent's employment status, and education.

Economic opportunities and employment - 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

Regarding the response of economic opportunities and employment to prevent radicalisation, the perceptions of its importance among respondents are even higher, with a cumulative importance of 84.0%. (1- 31.3%, 2- 23.5%, 3- 30.3%, and 4- 8.8%).

These cumulative perceptions among respondents are relatively consistent regardless of their settlements, and they are slightly higher among females (86.5%) compared to male respondents (81.6%). Additionally, there is a clear correlation between the level of education and the perceived importance of this response among respondents. However, the research data does not indicate any other correlations between this response and the respondents' living arrangements, employment status, as well as their parent's education and employment status.

The cumulative perceptions of the importance of religious education to prevent radicalisation among respondents have reached 64%. (1 - 19%, 2 - 15.2%, 3 - 14.4%, and 4 - 15.4%)

Religious education - 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

On the other hand, the cumulative perceptions of the importance of religious education as a response to prevent radicalisation are higher among rural respondents, with a cumulative percentage of 69.4%, compared to those from urban areas, where the cumulative percentage is 60.9%. Among male respondents, the cumulative perception is 66.0%, while among female respondents, it is slightly lower at 63.3%. However, the research data does not reveal any correlation between the importance of religious education and the respondents' level of education, living arrangements, employment status, or their parent's education and employment status.

Regarding the response of equal distribution of services and wealth within the country, the cumulative perceptions of its importance among respondents reach 68%. (1- 13.3%, 2- 13.3%, 3- 18.4%, and 4- 23.0%). Cumulative perceptions of this response are higher among rural respondents, with 72.6%, compared to those from urban areas, where the cumulative percentage is 65.4%. Among male respondents, the cumulative perception is 72.1%, while among female respondents, it is slightly lower at 64.8%.

Similarly, the research data does not indicate any correlation between the response of equal distribution of services and wealth within the country and the respondents' level of education, living arrangements, employment status, as well as their parent's education and employment status.

Equal distribution of services and wealth within the country - 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

Concerning the response of addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims, the cumulative perceptions of its importance among respondents are relatively lower, amounting to 39.6%. The perception of the importance of addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims is relatively consistent among respondents regardless of their settlements and gender. However, it decreases with the level of the respondents' education.

Nevertheless, the research data has not revealed any correlation between this response and the respondents' living arrangements, employment status, as well as their parents' education and employment status.

Addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims- 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

Regarding the response of offering opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces, the cumulative perceptions of its importance among respondents amount to 43.6%. The cumulative perceptions of this response are higher among respondents from urban areas, with a percentage of 46.1%, compared to those from rural areas, where the cumulative percentage is 39.1%. Among male respondents, the cumulative perception is 45.6%, while among female respondents, it is slightly lower at 42.7%. Additionally, it is worth noting that the importance of this response decreases with the level of the respondents' education.

Offering opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces- 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

In light of this context, the research data does not indicate any correlation between the response of offering opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces and factors such as the respondents' living arrangements, employment status, as well as their parents' education and employment status.

Working on digital spaces and platforms- 1 the most important and 9 the least important response to prevent radicalisation

Regarding the response of working on digital spaces and platforms, the cumulative perceptions of its importance among respondents are relatively lower, reaching 32.3%. The cumulative perceptions are slightly higher among respondents from urban areas, with a percentage of 33.8%, compared to those from rural areas, where the cumulative percentage is 29.9%. Among female respondents, the cumulative perception is 32.5%, while among male respondents, it is slightly lower at 29.9%.

Moreover, no correlation has been identified between the importance of this response and the respondents' living arrangements, level of education, employment status, as well as their parents' level of education and employment status.

Cumulative importance of the responses to radicalism

In conclusion, the research data presented a comprehensive analysis of respondents' perceptions regarding various responses to prevent radicalisation. They provide the meaningful evidence to deduce that among the responses to radicalism, the highest cumulative importance is attributed to economic opportunities and employment, with a percentage of 84.0%. This is followed by political rights and representation, which garnered a cumulative importance of 72.8%. The response of equal distribution of services and wealth within the country achieved a cumulative importance of 68.0%, while religious

education received a cumulative importance of 64.0%. Opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces were perceived to be of moderate importance, with a cumulative percentage of 43.6%. Addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims garnered a lower cumulative importance of 39.6%, and working on digital spaces and platforms had the lowest cumulative importance at 32.30%.

3.4. LOCAL SPECIFICITIES

As mentioned in the introduction, the total population, according to the latest census held in 2011, in the municipality of Prishtina is 198,897; in the municipality of Ferizaj is 108,610; in the municipality of Peja is 96,450; and in the municipality of Prizren is 177,781. The total population of these district centres or municipalities is 581,288, with Prishtina accounting for 34.2%, Ferizaj for 18.6%, Peja for 16.6%, and Prizren for 30.6% of the total population. In these cities, the vast majority of the population is of Albanian ethnicity and belongs to the Muslim religion, with small Roman Catholic, Protestant, Christian Orthodox, and Jewish communities.

However, the analysis of research data has revealed some interesting features regarding local specificities in relation to the drivers of radicalisation. Similar to general statistics in all four cities, the most significant driver of radicalism based on cumulative perceptions among the respondents is economics. On the other hand, politics is considered the second most important driver, except in Peja, where religion is considered the second most important. Religion is ranked third in importance in all cities, except in Peja. The fourth most important driver across all municipalities is territorial inequalities. Lastly, transnational dynamics are considered the least important driver in all cities, with the lowest cumulative importance observed among the respondents from Ferizaj (9.7%).

In terms of the drivers of culture and leisure and digital space, the perceptions among respondents in these municipalities differ from the general statistics in terms of their ranking of importance. In Peja, Prishtina, and Prizren, culture and leisure are considered more important than the digital space. However, in Ferizaj, the digital space is ranked as more important compared to culture and leisure.

Ferizaj: Cumulative importance of the drivers of radicalisation

Peja: Cumulative importance of the drivers of radicalisation

Regarding the respondents' views on responses to prevent radicalisation, there are significant differences in terms of their individual importance compared to the general statistics and among these municipalities. In line with the general statistics, respondents from Prishtina, Prizren, and Ferizaj consider economic opportunities and employment as the most important response to radicalisation. However, in Peja, the most important response is perceived to be political rights and representation.

Similarly, in accordance with the general statistics, the second most important response varies across the municipalities. In Prishtina, it is political rights and representation; in Prizren, it is equal distribution of services and wealth; in Peja, it is economic opportunities and employment; and interestingly, in Ferizaj, it is religious education.

Prishtina: Cumulative importance of the responses to radicalism

Prizren: Cumulative importance of the responces to radicalism

The third-ranked response in terms of importance, according to the general statistics, is equal distribution of services and wealth within the country. This holds true among respondents from Peja and Prizren, while among those from Prishtina, it is the response of religious education, and in Ferizaj, it is political rights and representation. The fourth-ranked response, based on the general statistics, is religious education, which

is the case in Prizren and Peja, while in Prishtina and Ferizaj, it is equal distribution of services and wealth. The fifth-ranked response in terms of importance, according to the general statistics, is offering opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces. This is also the case among respondents from Prishtina and Prizren, whereas in Peja and Ferizaj, the response is addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims.

The sixth-ranked response, according to the importance attributed by respondents, is addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims. This is observed in Prishtina and Prizren, while in Peja and Ferizaj, it is addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims as well.

On the other hand, among respondents in all the designated cities for this research, the response of working on digital spaces and platforms is considered the least important one.

In conclusion, the findings regarding the drivers of radicalisation and the perceived importance of various responses to prevent radicalisation among respondents in the municipalities of Prishtina, Prizren, Ferizaj, and Peja reveal significant differences both in relation to general statistics and among the municipalities themselves. Economic opportunities and employment emerge as the most important driver of radicalisation, followed by politics, religion, territorial inequalities, and transnational dynamics.

However, when examining the individual responses to prevent radicalisation, variations arise. The importance attributed to different responses differs among the municipalities. While economic opportunities and employment are consistently seen as crucial in Prishtina, Prizren, and Ferizaj, the response of political rights and representation is considered most important in Peja. Furthermore, the ranking of other responses, such as equal distribution of services and wealth, religious education, cultural dialogue and recreational spaces, and addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims, varies among the municipalities.

These findings highlight the need to consider local specificities and perspectives when formulating strategies to counter radicalisation. A comprehensive approach that takes into account the unique dynamics and priorities of each municipality is crucial. Additionally, it is worth noting that digital spaces and platforms are generally perceived as less important in the context of preventing radicalisation.

Overall, this research underscores the complexity of radicalisation drivers and the importance of tailoring responses to address the specific needs and concerns of different communities within the studied municipalities. Such insights can inform the development of targeted interventions and policies aimed at effectively preventing and countering radicalisation in Kosovo.

Conclusion

This research has shed light on the perceptions among the surveyed participants regarding predefined drivers of radicalism and VE, including religion, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, digital socialisation, political issues, education, culture, leisure opportunities, and transnational dynamics.

The prevalence of religiosity among respondents and its influence on attitudes and perceptions underscore the role of religious communities in social mobilisation. Concerns about radicalisation within these communities highlight the potential for religious leaders to act as mobilisers.

In relation to economic deprivation, the survey results indicate that most participants belong to the middle or upper middle class and express job satisfaction, suggesting a lack of economic deprivation among them. While economic deprivation is often considered a driver of radicalisation, the findings in this context suggest that the relationship between economic status and radicalisation may not be straightforward. The presence of radicalisation drivers and motivations may vary among individuals, and factors other than economic deprivation may play more significant roles in this specific context.

Regarding territorial inequalities, the research findings suggest that respondents generally feel safer in their neighbourhoods compared to their area, town or city at large. Safety perceptions vary based on gender and settlement, with males and rural residents feeling safer overall, thus reflecting the impact of geographic location on social dynamics.

High levels of internet access and utilisation, as well as awareness of VPNs, indicate the significant role of digital spaces in socialisation, and emphasises the role that technology may play in mobilising individuals for various causes, including extremist ideologies.

Concerning political issues, the survey uncovers varying levels of trust in different institutions in Kosovo. The high levels of trust in the police and the army suggest that these institutions are perceived as pillars of security and stability within Kosovo. This trust likely stems from their roles in the post-conflict and post-independence period. High levels of trust in these security institutions can contribute to social cohesion and a sense of safety among the population. The relatively high trust in religious leaders indicates their significant influence and credibility within the community. It suggests that many individuals look to religious leaders for guidance and moral authority, due to the low level of trust that political parties and the media enjoy in Kosovo. On the other hand, a moderate level of trust in local government, national government, the judiciary, and civil society reflects a complex and nuanced relationship between citizens and these institutions. It underscores the need for ongoing efforts to enhance transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to address citizens' concerns and strengthen trust in governance and civic organisations. Concerning transnational dynamics, the perception of a high impact of diaspora on society and its connection with the resident population suggests that the diaspora plays a substantial role in shaping the

social, economic, and cultural fabric of the home country. On the other hand, the perceived low influence on individual and religious life suggests that while the diaspora may have a broader societal impact, it may not significantly shape the personal beliefs, practices, or religious affiliations of individuals. This could indicate that personal religious choices are more influenced by local factors, family, or individual convictions.

Furthermore, this research has shed light on the influence of exposure to violence on the drivers' perceptions of VE. The findings reveal that respondents have very low levels of participation in physically violent conflicts across various contexts. Moreover, conflicts with individuals of different political or religious convictions, conflicts with the police, and conflicts with partners are very rare occurrences. These findings underscore the complexity of the relationship between exposure to violence and perceptions of VE. It suggests that, in this surveyed population, direct participation in violent conflicts is uncommon, and this low participation may not be a significant driver of radicalisation. It also highlights the potential importance of addressing broader factors influencing radicalisation beyond just exposure to physical violence.

The research data also provides insights into the cumulative importance attributed by respondents to the drivers of VE. Notably, the findings reveal that respondents consider economics as the most significant driver of VE. This implies that many individuals in the surveyed population believe that economic factors, such as poverty, unemployment, or financial inequalities, play a central role in motivating people to embrace extremist ideologies or engage in violent acts. Politics and religion are also regarded as highly influential drivers of VE, closely trailing behind economics. This suggests that respondents recognise the potential impact of political grievances and religious ideologies in motivating individuals towards extremism and violence. In contrast to economics, politics, and religion, respondents assign relatively lower importance to drivers such as territorial inequalities, culture and leisure, and transnational dynamics. This implies that, in the eyes of the surveyed population, these factors may have a less pronounced role in contributing to VE.

The research findings shed also light on the opinions of young people regarding public policies aimed at PVE. A majority of the surveyed respondents express support for the belief that religious education can effectively contain and limit the risk of VE. This indicates that many young people see value in incorporating education on religions as a strategy to address and mitigate extremist ideologies. It suggests that they view religious education as a potential tool for countering radicalisation and promoting tolerance.

Opinions on state policies and measures offering equal rights and resources for all citizens are more divided among the respondents. The lack of a clear correlation between these viewpoints and demographic variables or background characteristics suggests a complex range of perspectives. This complexity implies that young people may have diverse views on the effectiveness of policies aimed at ensuring equal rights. It underscores the need for nuanced and context-specific approaches to policy development.

The idea of monitoring social media as a tool to combat VE receives substantial support, particularly among urban respondents and male participants. This indicates a recognition among young people of the potential role of the social media in identifying and addressing extremist content. It suggests that they believe monitoring online spaces can be an effective means of preventing the spread of extremist ideologies.

The research findings also suggest that young people perceive a relatively low level of violent reactions due to their religious beliefs. This implies that many respondents do not associate their faith with a propensity for VE. It highlights the importance of distinguishing between religious beliefs and radicalisation tendencies.

The research data indicates that economic opportunities and employment are perceived as the most significant factors in preventing radicalisation. This suggests that respondents view economic stability and the availability of jobs as critical in reducing the appeal of extremist ideologies. It aligns with the idea that addressing economic grievances can be an effective strategy in countering radicalisation. Following economic factors, political rights and representation are considered important in preventing radicalisation. This underscores the role of inclusive political systems and representation in addressing grievances and providing avenues for peaceful expression of concerns. It highlights the importance of political engagement and empowerment in countering extremism. Respondents also emphasise the importance of equal distribution of services and wealth within the country. This reflects concerns about social justice and equitable access to resources. It suggests that addressing disparities in access to basic services and wealth distribution is viewed as essential for preventing radicalisation. Religious education is recognised as a significant factor, albeit slightly less so than economic and political factors. This implies that many respondents see value in educational initiatives that promote religious tolerance and understanding. Opportunities for cultural dialogue and recreational spaces are considered moderately important. While not the highest priorities, these factors still hold relevance in fostering social cohesion and preventing radicalisation. Respondents assign lower importance to addressing injustices against fellow Arabs and Muslims. This may indicate a perception that such injustices are less influential in driving radicalisation compared to economic and political factors.

The research highlights significant differences in respondents' perceptions of the drivers of radicalisation and the importance of prevention responses, both in comparison to general statistics and among different municipalities. This underscores the importance of considering local contexts and tailoring prevention strategies to specific community needs and concerns.

Finally, the research conducted at the micro level has revealed a discrepancy in relation to the findings conducted at the macro and meso levels. At the macro and meso levels of research, the primary drivers of VE in Kosovo are considered to be religion, specifically violent misinterpretations of Islam, along with digital literacy and transnational dynamics, which was not limited solely to diaspora. Conversely, the findings of the micro-level research indicate that economics is considered the most significant driver of VE, followed closely by politics and religion. This discrepancy underscores the complexity of radicalisation processes and the importance of considering multiple levels of analysis. What drives extremism at the societal or regional level may not necessarily align with individual perceptions and experiences on the ground.

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What drives youth to violent extremism? How can they turn from being "the problem" into "the key" for a solution? By engaging youth in the research, CONNEKT will raise young voices to become stakeholders in the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.

CONNEKT is a research and action project which analyses seven potential radicalisation factors among youth aged between 12 and 30: religion, digitalisation, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, socio-political demands, and educational, cultural and leisure opportunities and evaluates them on three levels: transnational/state, community and individual.

Its aim is to establish a multi-dimensional map of drivers of extremism among youth in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bulgaria, and to identify the interplay between them. Based on the empirical research findings, the project will end up recommending tools and measures for the prevention of violent extremism from a social and community perspective both for the regions of study and the European Union.

Under the coordination of the European Institute of the Mediterranean, (IEMed), the project gathers a multidisciplinary Consortium involving 14 partners from MENA, the EU and the Balkans.